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## White Paper

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**National Association of State Boards of Accountancy Private Equity Task Force**

**Alternative Practice Structures & Private Equity: Considerations and Questions for Boards of Accountancy**

**October 24, 2025**

**Comments are requested by February 28, 2026**

**Submit all comments to [petaskforce@nasba.org](mailto:petaskforce@nasba.org)**

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## **National Association of State Boards of Accountancy Private Equity Task Force**

### **Alternative Practice Structures & Private Equity: Considerations and Questions for Boards of Accountancy**

#### **Executive Summary**

Private equity (PE) investment in the accounting profession is an emerging trend that offers opportunities for growth, modernization, and succession. Yet it also raises questions related to how Boards of Accountancy regulate this issue to ensure public protection.

In response to these questions, National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA) Chair Maria Caldwell appointed the NASBA Private Equity Task Force (PE Task Force) to evaluate the implications of PE investment in the accounting profession and identify ways to support state boards in their oversight responsibilities. The PE Task Force is also charged with exploring how PE ownership may impact the public interest, firm independence, governance structures, and audit quality.

The members of the Private Equity Task Force are:

- Dan Vuckovich, CPA, Chair—NASBA Board of Directors’ Member; NASBA Mountain Regional Director; Member, Montana Board of Public Accountants
- Barry Berkowitz, CPA—NASBA Board of Directors’ Directors-at-Large Member
- Boyd Busby, CPA—Executive Director, Alabama State Board of Public Accountancy
- Dominic Franzella—Executive Officer, California Board of Accountancy
- Dale Mullen, Esq.—Member, Virginia Board of Accountancy
- David Nance, CPA—Executive Director, North Carolina Board of CPA Examiners
- Steve Platau, CPA—Member, Florida Board of Accountancy
- Melissa Ruff, CPA—NASBA Board of Directors’ Member; NASBA Central Regional Director; Chair, Nebraska Board of Public Accountancy

The purpose of this paper is for the PE Task Force to educate Boards of Accountancy and policymakers about both the benefits and challenges of PE investment and raise questions

about how best to protect investors and the public interest. While identifying key questions, this paper is not intended to provide guidance on how Boards of Accountancy should modify their oversight practices or statutory frameworks.

The paper includes:

- Background on Board of Accountancy regulation of certified public accountants (CPAs) and CPA firms
- An introduction to CPA firms operating in Alternative Practice Structure (APS) models that have PE investment
- Three key topics and questions for Boards of Accountancy on regulating PE investment in CPA firms

NASBA's Private Equity Task Force seeks feedback from Boards of Accountancy and other key stakeholders regarding the content of this white paper, and in particular regarding the key topics and questions. Please submit any comments and questions to [petaskforce@nasba.org](mailto:petaskforce@nasba.org) by February 28, 2026.

### **Background on Board of Accountancy Regulation of CPAs and CPA Firms**

State legislatures charge Boards of Accountancy with regulating CPAs and CPA firms<sup>1</sup> to protect the public interest. Boards of Accountancy accomplish this by enforcing standards of competence, ethical conduct, and independence in the performance of public accounting services.

Generally, CPAs and CPA firms must be licensed to perform attest engagements. These engagements produce an examination, opinion, agreed-upon procedures report, or assurance regarding information provided by a third party. Financial statement users (including investors and banks) rely on attest work to make key investment decisions. Therefore, Board of Accountancy regulation of attest work is critical to the functioning of the U.S. economy.

Additionally, Boards of Accountancy require CPAs and CPA firms to comply with various professional standards, such as generally accepted auditing standards and the American

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<sup>1</sup> The Uniform Accountancy Act defines "CPA Firm" in §3 of the Ninth Edition (2025):

"Firm" means a sole proprietorship, a corporation, a partnership or any other entity that is practicing public accountancy as defined by the Act and has been duly registered with the appropriate State Board of Accountancy." Uniform Accountancy Act, §3(f), 2025. For purposes of this paper, we distinguish between firms registered and licensed to practice public accountancy ("CPA firms") and all other entities, which are regarded as "non-CPA firms" under the regulatory framework. See also Fn. 5.

Institute of CPAs (AICPA) Code of Professional Conduct.<sup>2</sup> Due to the evolving nature of the accounting profession, Boards of Accountancy also require CPAs to complete continuing professional education to maintain or enhance their knowledge.

Boards of Accountancy require CPA firms that provide attest services to participate in an approved peer review program. The primary objective of peer review is to monitor and enhance the quality of accounting, auditing, and attestation services provided by CPA firms. Peer review evaluates a firm's system of quality control/management as it relates to its accounting and auditing practice for non-issuer (privately held) clients (when a system review is required or elected) or through an evaluation of select engagements (when eligible for an engagement review). In contrast, audits of issuers (public companies) fall under the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Peer review gives the public, regulators, and other financial statement users greater confidence in the reliability of the information they receive.

### **An Introduction to CPA firms operating in APS models that have PE investment**

Non-CPA minority ownership has long been permitted within CPA firm structures. However, regulatory requirements governing firm ownership impose important limitations. Most states' laws mandate that a majority of a CPA firm's ownership—both in terms of equity and voting rights—be held by licensed CPAs.<sup>3</sup> In addition, at least 44 jurisdictions require that non-CPA firm owners be individual persons who are actively engaged in the firm's business.<sup>4</sup> These legal provisions restrict the extent to which non-licensees and passive investors can hold an ownership interest in a CPA firm. As a result, PE investors often structure their involvement in CPA firms through APSs which allow for investment in the non-attest side of the firm's business while ensuring that attest services remain under the control and oversight of licensed CPAs, in compliance with professional and regulatory requirements.

The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct defines an APS as “a form of organization in which a CPA firm that provides attest services is closely aligned with another public or

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<sup>2</sup> The American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) Code of Professional Conduct is widely adopted throughout the U.S. At least 37 Boards of Accountancy have adopted the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct by reference in whole or in part. A further 8 Boards of Accountancy have their own state code of professional conduct, containing references to, or largely based on, the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct. Thus, any existing or new AICPA Code of Professional Conduct requirements will flow down to most states' laws and rules.

<sup>3</sup> Two jurisdictions (Hawaii and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands) require 100% CPA ownership of firms. All other jurisdictions require majority licensee ownership.

<sup>4</sup> The Ninth Edition of the Uniform Accountancy Act (2025) at §7(c)(2) also includes this requirement: “Any CPA or PA firm as defined in this Act may include non-licensee owners provided that ... [a]ll non-licensee owners are of good moral character and active individual participants in the CPA or PA firm or affiliated entities.” The terms “active individual participant” and “affiliated entities” are not defined in the Uniform Accountancy Act or Model Rules.

private organization [non-attest entity]<sup>5</sup> that performs other professional services.”<sup>6</sup> This non-attest entity may receive PE investment, provide non-attest services, and perform key administrative functions for both entities. See Appendix 2, Table 1 for a diagram of a simplified ownership structure of an APS structured CPA firm.

Generally, APS, as it pertains to PE in CPA firms, operates in a business structure whereby the CPA firm providing attest/assurance services (often referred to as the “attest firm”) is closely aligned with the non-attest entity. See Appendix 2, Table 2 for a diagram of a simplified ownership structure of a CPA firm operating in an APS model that has PE investment.

During the 1990s, many CPA firms sought to expand beyond traditional audit and tax services into consulting, technology, and financial advisory work. However, as mentioned previously, state laws and professional regulations limit non-CPA ownership and investment in CPA firms. These restrictions made it difficult for firms to access external capital or form partnerships with non-CPA professionals, such as management consultants and IT specialists. To overcome these barriers, firms began developing APSs which allowed investors and non-CPAs to participate financially in the broader business while keeping the attest function under the control of licensed CPAs, as required by law.

Following the proliferation of this new investment model, the AICPA and Boards of Accountancy clarified rules and standards on ownership and independence, reinforcing that only CPA-owned entities could issue attest reports. APSs provided a way to separate the attest entity (CPA-owned) from the non-attest entity (which could be owned and/or funded by non-CPAs). This model preserved compliance with state accountancy laws while enabling firms to remain competitive and attract non-CPA expertise and investment.

The APS framework remains relevant today, as PE investment in APS firm structures has recently increased significantly. The APS model allows firms to balance the profession’s regulatory requirements with market flexibility and growth opportunities. This increased PE investment has occurred across the country in larger and smaller markets, and has impacted small, medium, and large firms.<sup>7</sup> PE investment in CPA firms follows several

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<sup>5</sup> The Ninth Edition of the Uniform Accountancy Act (2025) does not include a definition for “non-CPA firm” or “non-attest entity.” Rather, a non-CPA firm or non-attest entity is understood contextually as any entity providing accounting-related services that is not licensed by its Board of Accountancy. That is, a firm which does not hold a permit to practice public accountancy. Uniform Accountancy Act, §3(f).

<sup>6</sup> Alternative Practice Structures interpretation (ET sec. 1.220.020) of the Independence Rule.

<sup>7</sup> Press accounts from 2023 and 2024 cite examples of small, medium, and large sized attest firms being approached by PE investors. See, e.g., Journal of Accounting, *Private Equity Eyes CPA firms Large and Small*, Feb. 1, 2023 (noting that more than half of the largest attest firms are involved in, or contemplating, PE-backed APS structures); see also CFO Brew, *Private Equity is Reshaping the Accounting Profession*, Sept. 17, 2024 (Reportedly, “you have midsized PE firms partnering with midsized accounting firms, and now you even

other recent trends, including PE investment in other licensed professions, such as medical and engineering professions.<sup>8</sup> This trend has also coincided with the increased adoption of artificial intelligence within the CPA profession; the need for access to increased capital to supply attest firms with improved information technology resources; and recent waves of firm consolidation and restructuring associated with retirements at small firms.<sup>9</sup>

Reportedly, PE investors find CPA firms to be an attractive investment vehicle for several reasons, including the fact that they “often have stable, recurring revenue streams,” and given that “the fragmented nature of the accounting industry presents opportunities for consolidation and economies of scale.”<sup>10</sup>

Under the APS model, attest firms provide audit and assurance services, as required by law. The attest firm’s ownership structure must continue to adhere to requirements that maintain CPA ownership and control of the attest firm. The non-attest entity provides non-attest services including tax, consulting, management, and advisory services. The ownership structure for the non-attest firm varies, and may include a combination of CPAs, CPA partners in the attest firm, PE investors, and potentially other individuals and/or entity owners.

The attest firm and non-attest entity operate under a wide-ranging administrative services agreement. The non-attest entity provides centralized administrative functions to the attest firm including human resources, staffing, information technology, marketing, and general office administration. The attest firm and non-attest entity generally share branding, websites, and some operational leadership.

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have small PE firms partnering with small CPA firms”); see also CFO Brew, *Private Equity Now Has a Stake in 20 of the Top 30 CPA Firms*, Nov. 20, 2024.

<sup>8</sup> Some CPAs have asked questions about news and periodical coverage critical of private equity investment in medical professions. See, e.g., Bloomberg Tax, *Private Equity-Fueled Shakeup Coming for Accounting Industry*, April 30, 2025 (“Some studies have shown a deterioration in patient care after private equity targeted the health care industry, for instance, while others reported slightly improved care”); see also Wall Street Journal, *Doctors Warn Accountants of Private-Equity Drain on Quality: You Could be Next*, May 7, 2025 (“many doctors have decried private-equity firms’ push into healthcare, saying patient care has eroded under their ownership”).

<sup>9</sup> See Thomson Reuters, *Some Tax, Audit & CPA firms are Rejecting Private Equity in Favor of Independence*, May 30, 2025 (“Private equity has flooded the profession with capital for firms to pay retiring partners, acquire smaller firms, improve technology, and expand client services.”)

<sup>10</sup> See Thomson Reuters, *The Rise of Private Equity in Accounting: Not Just for Large Firms Anymore*, Aug. 20, 2024.

## **Three Key Topics and Questions for Boards of Accountancy on Regulating PE Investment in CPA Firms**

The PE Task Force has identified three key topics for consideration by Boards of Accountancy: independence and professional standards; disclosure and public understanding; and regulatory oversight and enforcement. Under each of these three categories below, this white paper poses questions for Boards of Accountancy regarding responsible regulation of the accounting profession and protection of the public interest.

### **1. Independence and Professional Standards**

#### **Summary:**

Independence remains the cornerstone of public trust in the accounting profession. When PE investors become closely aligned with CPA firms through APSs, complex relationships emerge that can threaten both actual and perceived independence.<sup>11</sup> The fundamental challenge lies in ensuring that attest firms maintain the requisite professional judgment, technical competence, and ethical standards while operating within increasingly sophisticated ownership and management structures.<sup>12</sup> Boards of Accountancy should evaluate whether existing independence frameworks adequately address the unique risks posed by PE involvement, including potential conflicts arising from shared management, compensation structures, and client relationships across attest firms and non-attest entities.

To ensure compliance with professional standards, non-attest entities' involvement in management, compensation, and performance evaluation decisions regarding CPAs at attest firms must not affect audit quality and auditor independence. The current version of the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (AICPA Code) includes independence rules;<sup>13</sup> requirements for organizational structures and names;<sup>14</sup> guidance regarding organizational structures and names,<sup>15</sup> including defining whether a firm is part of a “network” and determining what name requirements would apply to connected and related attest firms and related non-attest organizations.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Wall Street Journal, *Private Equity Has Closer Ties to Companies’ Auditors Than Ever Before*, Oct. 30, 2024.

<sup>12</sup> Accounting Today, *Capital vs. Control: PE’s Impact on CPA Firms*, Dec. 5, 2024.

<sup>13</sup> AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, last updated March 1, 2025, at Secs. 1.200.001; 1.220.020; and Sec. 1.800.001.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Sec. 1.800.001.

<sup>15</sup> *Id.* at Sec. 1.810.050.

<sup>16</sup> *Id.* at Sec. 400.35.

In response to the proliferation of PE investment in attest firms, AICPA's Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) recently issued a memorandum flagging potential gaps in this guidance as it pertains to attest firms operating in an APS model with PE investment.<sup>17</sup> PEEC's review and revision process should result in an exposure draft of the standard changes later in 2025, followed by the roll-out of new AICPA Code language aimed specifically at PE investment practices.<sup>18</sup>

### **Core Questions:**

- How should attest firms operating in an APS model with PE investment maintain audit quality and avoid undue influence and pressure to perform, if non-attest entities influence the attest firm's management, compensation, and performance evaluations?
- What restrictions should apply to PE investors and their portfolio companies becoming attest clients of an attest firm within their same shared APS structure?
- How should peer review processes address the complexity of independence considerations introduced by APS structures with PE investment?
- Are there adequate safeguards to ensure that attest firms maintain the necessary internal knowledge and frameworks for compliance with the AICPA Code, and federal/state laws and rules, specifically around the protection of confidential client information?
- How can Boards of Accountancy and other standard setting bodies address independence concerns based on the size and scale of attest firms' relationships?
- Are there positions taken within PEEC's memorandum *Potential revisions to the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct and guidance related to independence in alternative practice structures* that you believe should impose more restrictive requirements regarding attest firm independence? If so, which provisions, how would you modify them, and why?
- Would your Board of Accountancy consider adopting stricter laws or rules associated with independence than those in the AICPA Code, to enhance public protection?

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<sup>17</sup> See AICPA Professional Ethics Division, *Potential revisions to the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct and guidance related to independence in alternative practice structures*, March 10, 2025.

<sup>18</sup> See *id.* NASBA has responded to the PEEC request for comments with a June 13, 2025 response letter, available on NASBA's website: <https://nasba.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/June-13-2025-NASBA-Response-Letter-PEEC-APS-DM-FINAL.pdf>.

## 2. Disclosure and Public Understanding

### **Summary:**

Commentators have noted that "an auditor's objectivity, both real and perceived, is critical to the business of [CPA] firms, which typically also have consulting and tax operations."<sup>19</sup> Thus, "experts stress the importance of a clear distinction between which parts of a firm are owned by CPAs and which are not, both from a legal standpoint and a client relationship perspective."<sup>20</sup>

The public's ability to make informed decisions about professional services depends on clear, accessible information about firm ownership, service boundaries, and regulatory oversight. When APS structures with PE investment blur traditional firm boundaries, enhanced disclosure requirements become essential to maintain transparency and consumer protection.

### **Core Questions:**

- Should Boards of Accountancy require more prominent and standardized disclosures on websites and marketing materials, distinguishing attest and non-attest entities under common control?
- How can Boards of Accountancy better educate consumers about the distinction between attest and non-attest services in APS structures?
- What clarity is needed regarding Uniform Accountancy Act and Model Rules' wording on the use of the CPA title<sup>21</sup> by individuals not associated with attest firms?
- How should advertising practices be regulated to provide transparency regarding the relationship between attest firms and non-attest entities?

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<sup>19</sup> Wall Street Journal, *Private Equity Has Closer Ties to Companies' Auditors Than Ever Before*, Oct. 30, 2024.

<sup>20</sup> Accounting Today, *Capital vs. Control: PE's Impact on CPA Firms*, Dec. 5, 2024.

<sup>21</sup> When individuals who have earned the CPA license are allowed to display the designation, consumers are afforded a greater understanding regarding these individuals' background. Consumers can review Board of Accountancy websites to understand the regulatory framework, including how individuals obtained licensure; consumers can review online licensing records, including prior enforcement information; and consumers have a place to file a complaint, should the need arise.

### **3. Regulatory Oversight and Enforcement**

#### **Summary:**

The emergence of APS models that have PE investment creates challenges for Board of Accountancy oversight and enforcement capabilities. Traditional regulatory frameworks were designed for simpler firm structures operating within clear jurisdictional boundaries. Firms operating in an APS structure with PE investment often operate across multiple states with complex ownership structures, exposing regulatory gaps or inconsistencies between jurisdictions.

Boards of Accountancy should adapt their oversight mechanisms to ensure effective regulation of these sophisticated structures while maintaining their core mission of public protection. This includes developing new approaches to licensing, monitoring, and enforcement that account for the interstate and multi-entity nature of modern attest firms.

#### **Core Questions:**

- What are the implications of differing state definitions of “the practice of public accountancy” for attest firms operating nationally under APS models?
- Would Boards of Accountancy find it helpful for the UAA to include definitions of “active individual participant” or “affiliated entities” within its requirements for non-CPA firm owners?<sup>22</sup>
- How should Boards of Accountancy coordinate oversight when CPA firms operating under an APS model with PE investments conduct business across multiple jurisdictions?
- Regarding CPA firm registration requirements, do Boards of Accountancy need details on an attest firm’s principal place of business and physical presence in the jurisdiction, to ensure compliance with relevant laws and rules?

#### **Conclusion**

The PE Task Force encourages responses from Boards of Accountancy and other key stakeholders regarding the questions and topics included in the white paper. Please submit any comments and questions to [petaskforce@nasba.org](mailto:petaskforce@nasba.org) by January 31, 2026.

Responses received will guide NASBA and the PE Task Force’s next steps on this issue, including potentially suggesting revisions to the Uniform Accountancy Act and Model Rules

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<sup>22</sup> Uniform Accountancy Act § 7(c)(2)(B): “Any CPA or PA firm as defined in this Act may include non-licensee owners provided that ... All non-licensee owners are of good moral character and active individual participants in the CPA or PA firm or affiliated entities.”


for consideration by the AICPA/NASBA Uniform Accountancy Act Committee; a PE Task Force report highlighting key questions and concerns; and future webinars and presentations educating stakeholders on this topic.

## **Appendix 1: Sources**

- Journal of Accountancy, *Private Equity Eyes CPA firms Large and Small*, Feb. 1, 2023.
- Thomson Reuters, *The Rise of Private Equity in Accounting: Not Just for Large Firms Anymore*, Aug. 20, 2024.
- CFO Brew, *Private Equity is Reshaping the Accounting Profession*, Sept. 17, 2024.
- Wall Street Journal, *Private Equity's Ties to Companies' Auditors Have Never Been Closer. That Worries Some Regulators*, Oct. 30, 2024.
- CFO Brew, *Private Equity Now Has a Stake in 20 of the Top 30 CPA Firms*, Nov. 20, 2024.
- Accounting Today, *Capital vs. Control: PE's Impact on CPA Firms*, Dec. 5, 2024.
- Bloomberg Tax, *Private Equity-Fueled Shakeup Coming for Accounting Industry*, April 30, 2025.
- Wall Street Journal, *Doctors Warn Accountants of Private-Equity Drain on Quality: You Could be Next*, May 7, 2025.
- Thomson Reuters, *Some Tax, Audit & CPA firms are Rejecting Private Equity in Favor of Independence*, May 30, 2025.

## Appendix 2: Tables

**Table 1:** The following is a diagram of a typical APS structure, applicable to any investor.<sup>23</sup>



### LEGEND


Administrative Services Agreement
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Attest firm
Entities in investor structure
other owners/ partners/ principals

### NOTES

- (1) Attest firm partners and employees are leased from the nonattest entity. Attest firm has its own board of directors elected by attest firm partners. Attest firm board makes all attest firm decisions.
- (2) Senior leadership of nonattest entity manages day-to-day operations and does not include investor representation. Nonattest entity has its own board of directors with investor representation relative to level of investment.
- (3) Public or private investment in nonattest entity that provides for significant influence or control over the nonattest entity.
- (4) Attest firm compensates nonattest entity through this agreement for administrative support and resources.

<sup>23</sup> See AICPA Professional Ethics Division, *Potential revisions to the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct and guidance related to independence in alternative practice structures*, March 10, 2025.

**Table 2:** The following is a diagram of a typical ownership structure of a CPA firm operating in an APS model that has PE investment.<sup>24</sup>



<sup>24</sup> See *id.*